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RECENT CASES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DUE PROCESS-NORTH DAKOTA ATTACH-
MENT PROCEDURE HELD UNCONSTITUTIONAL
Plaintiffs had purchased a mobile home under a retail install-
ment contract and security agreement from defendant mobile home
company. According to the agreement, the mobile home company
and subsequent assignees were to retain title. The company then
assigned the retail contract and security agreement to defendant,
Western State Bank of Devils Lake, North Dakota, which took with
recourse. A second security agreement was taken by the bank co-
vering the mobile 'home and plaintiffs' automobile. Plaintiffs, hus-
band and wife, resided in the mobile home until they fell behind
on their installment payments,' Western then commenced an at-
tachment action against the plaintiffs and also instituted on ac-
tion for recovery of the debt. 2 Upon issuance of the warrant of
attachment by the clerk of court, the county sheriff3 seized plaif-
tiffs' mobile home and automobile. 4 Thereafter plaintiffs brought
an action against defendants in United States District Court alleg-
1. Plaintiffs alleged that the delinquency was due to "tremendous fuel bills" incurred
as a result of defects in the home, which required them to dedicate money to heating ex-
penses that would otherwise have been used for payments on the mobile home. Guzman v.
Western State Bank, 381 F. Supp. 1262, 1264 n.1 (1974), rev'd 516 F.2d 125 (8th Cir.
1975).
2. N.D. CENT. CODE Ch. 32-08 (1960), as amended, (1973 Supp.) sets forth the pro-
cedures for attachment. § 32-08-05 states:
At the time of applying for the warrant of attachment, the plaintiff shall
file In the office of the clerk of court of the court In which the action Is
commenced:
1. A verified complaint setting forth a proper cause of action for attach-
ment in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant;
2. An affidavit setting forth in substantially the language of the statute
one or more of the grounds of attachment enumerated in section 32-08-01,
if the claim upon which the action is commenced is due, and, if such claim
is not due, one or more of the grounds enumerated in subsections 3, 4, 6,
and 7 of that section ; and
3. An undertaking in accordance with section 32-08-06.
All of these procedures were followed in this case. 381 F. Supp. at 1264.
3. In addition to Western State Bank, other defendants named in this action included
the country sheriff, the president and the vice president of the bank, all three named III-
dividually and in their official capacities; and the owner of the mobile home company.
Guzman v. Western State Bank, 516 F.2d 125 (8th Cir. 1975).
4. Plaintiffs were not notified of the proceeding and neither of them were at home at
the time the sheriff and the vice president arrived to take the mobile home and automo-
bile. Plaintiff's wife subsequently arrived on the scene in response to a call from the
sheriff. After her unsuccessful attempt to dissuade the sheriff from seizing the mobile
home, some of the men accompanying the sheriff prepared to take the trailer away, first
removing the stripping from around the sides of the home. Because the wheels of the
trainer were frozen in the ground, the removal process was completed only after four and
one-half hours of effort, with the combined force of a truck and a tractor. Id.
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ing that in authorizing seizure without prior notice and hearing,
the North Dakota statute did not afford them due process of law
as required by the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution. The
District Court held that plaintiffs were not deprived of any right,
privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution because the in-
terests of the debtor are sufficiently protected by the statute even
though the law did not require prior notice and hearing.5  Plain-
tiffs appealed the decision to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit, which reversed the District Court decision
and held that the impact depriving plaintiffs of their sole place of
residence, absent assertions by the creditor that his interest in the
property might otherwise be defeated by plaintiffs' concealment,- di-
position or destruction of the property and absent meaningful judi-
cial supervision, constituted a denial of due process of law under
the fourteenth amendment. Guzman v. Western State Bank of Devils
Lake 516 F.2d 125 (1975).
When the attachment remedy was transplanted to America, its
scope was statutorily broadened to allow creditors to utilize the
process against local defendants, even when they could not be
served personally.e In North Dakota, a warrant of attachment will
issue only in connection with an action on the debt 7 and cannot
exist independently of such an action.8 Under the law, personal
5. 381 F. Supp. 1262.
6. The present-day action of attachment is a product of the customs of London of the
15th Century. Originally, the remedy was available only for use against non-residents, or
against residents who had absconded. The action of attachment in the United States is
purely statutory. For a detailed account of the history of attachment, garnishment, and
related creditor remedies see Levy, Attachment, Garnishment and Garnishment Execution:
Some American Problems Considered in the Light of the English Experience, 5 CONN. L.
REV. 899 (1972-73); Countryman, The Bill of Rights and the Bill Collector, 15 ARiz. L.
Rlv. 521 (1973).
7. N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-08-01 (Supp. 1973) allows for the attachment of the property
of the defendant in the following cases:
1. When the defendant is not a resident of this state or is a foreign corporation;
2. When the defendant has absconded or concealed himself;
3. When the defendant has removed or is about to remove his property, or a ma-
terial part thereof, from this state, not leaving enough therein for payment of his
debts;
4. When the defendant has sold, assigned, transferred, secreted, or otherwise dis-
posed of, or is about to sell, assign, transfer, secrete, or otherwise dispose of his
property, with intent to cheat or defraud his creditors, or to hinder or delay them
in the collection of their debts;
5. When the defendant is about to remove his residence from the county where he
resides with the intention of permanently changing same, and falls or neglects on
demand to give security for the debt upon which the action is commenced;
6. When the debt upon which the action is commenced was incurred for property
obtained under false pretenses;
7. When the defendant is about to remove his property or a material part thereof
from the state with the intent or to the effect of cheating or defrauding his credi-
tors or hindering or delaying them in the collection of their debts;
8. In an action to recover purchase money for personal property sold to the de-
fendant, an attachment may be issued and levied upon such property; and
9. In any action brought against the owner of any motor vehicle for damages al-
leged to have been caused by the negligence of such owner or his duly authorized
agent, the motor vehicle alleged to have been driven, occupied, or owned by a negli-
gent driver or owner thereof, at the time of the accident, may be attached.
8. The North Dakota attachment procedure requires that there be an action for the
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service must be made on the debtor within sixty days of issu-
ance of the warrant. 9
The first major case in the United States to deny the pre-
judgment attachment of a defendent's property under the due pro-
cess clause of the Constitution was Sniadach v. Family Fincence
Corp. 10 In Sniadach the Supreme Court held the prejudgment gar-
nishment statute of Wisconsin unconstitutional as violative of due
process guarantees. There, a small loan company suing on a note
owned by defendent, utilized the Wisconsin garnishment statute1
to require defendent's employer to hold the non-exempt portion of
her wages pending a decision as to the creditor's claim on the
debt. Pursuant to Wisconsin law,' 2 a summons was issued at the
request of creditor's lawyer, who then served the summons on the
debtor's employer. The non-exempt portion of the wages were then
retained by the employer, pending the outcome of the main suit,
without any opportunity on the part of the debtor to be heard.
The Court in Sniadach emphasized the impact of the ex parte
proceedings on the employee and, found that she was deprived of
a major portion of her wages "without any opportunity to be heard
and to tender any defense she may have. .... ,'s Justice Douglas
pointed out that such a procedure may "drive a wage earning fami-
ly to the wall."' 4 The ramifications of the holding in Sniadach were
initially unclear because the case dealt specifically with wages,
"a specialized type of property presenting distinct problems in our
economic system."' 5
In attempting to deal with the question left unanswered in
Sniadach as to precisely what type of property was to be in-
cluded within the scope of the holding, some courts ruled that on-
ly wages were to be included, whereas others expanded the rul-
ing to include other property, such as that seized under attach-
ment statutes.16
Three years later, the Supreme Court addressed itself to the
collection of money in connection with an attachment. See Gans v. Beasley, 4 N.D. 140,
59 N.W. 714 (1894).
9. N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-08-03 (1960) provides that: "[An action shall be deemed com-
menced when the summons is issued, but personal service of such summons must be made
or publication thereof commenced within sixty days after the issuance of the warrant of
attachment."
10. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
11. Garnishment differs from attachment in that attachment is a procedure exercised
over the property of a debtor who is himself in possession of the property, whereas gar-
nishment is exercised over the property of the debtor which is in the hands of a third
party, or garnishee.
12. WIs. STAT. AwN. § 267 (1965).
13. 395 U.S. 337, 339.
14. Id. at 341-42.
15. Id. at 340.
16. For a discussion on the ramifications of the Sniadach ruling, see Kennedy, Due
Process Limitations on Creditors, Remedies: Some Reflections on Sniadaech v. Family Fi-
nance Corp., 19 AM. U. L. REv. 158 (1970).
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question and expanded its holding in Sniadach to include other pro-
perty seized under state attachment statutes. Fuentes v. Shevin17
dealt with the replevin statutes of Florida and Pennsylvania, where
plaintiffs had bought household items"' on installment payment
plans, the items themselves constituting collateral on the debt.
The Court in Fuentes minimized the distinctions between the
deprivation of property considered "necessary" and a deprivation
of property of lesser importance saying:
[If] the root principle of procedural due process is to be
applied with objectivity, it can not rest on such distinc-
tions. The Fourteenth Amendment speaks of 'property' gen-
erally. And, under our free-enterprise system, an individual's
choices in the marketplace are respected, however unwise
they may seem to someone else. 19
However, the Court did not totally ignore the impact of certain
deprivations. The Court said:
While the length and consequent severity of a deprivation
may be another factor to weigh in determing the appropriate
form of hearing, it is not decisive of the basic right to a
prior hearing of some kind.
2 0
The Court further held that the fact that the debtor could post
a bond and thereby regain possession of the attached property was
not an adequate substitute for a prior hearing. As the Court stated:
When officials . . . seize one piece of property from a person's
possession and then agree to return it if he surrenders an-
other, they deprive him of property, whether or not he has
the funds, the knowledge, and the time to take advantage of
the recovery provision.2 1
The possibility of a wrongful issuance of the writ, the Court
found, was not sufficiently guarded against by the requirements
that the creditor post a bond, together with conclusory allegations
of ownership, or by the possibility that the creditor would be sub-
ject to liability in an action for damages if the writ were improvi-
dently issued. "[T]hose requirements are hardly a substitute for
a prior hearing, for they test no more than the applicant's own
belief in his rights.
' '22
According to Fuentes, in order to sustain the constitutionality
of any taking there must be notice and a hearing at a "meaning-
17. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
18. The Items involved included a stove, phonograph, a bed, a table and other household
goods. Id. at 70-71.
19. Id. at 90.
20. Id. at 86.
21. Id. at 85.
22. Id. at 83. The Court noted that such requirements may not even test that much, for
"if an applicant for the writ knows that he is dealing with an uneducated, uninformed
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ful time and in a meaningful manner. ' 23 The Court stated that
notice and a hearing "must be granted at a time when the de-
privation can still be prevented. . .. [N]o later hearing . . .
can undo the fact that the arbitrary taking . . . has already oc-
curred."
24
However, Fuentes left unanswered the question of what pro-
cedure the required hearing should follow. The Court did say that
"[t]he nature and form of such prior hearing . . are legiti-
mately open to many potential variations and are a subject . . .
for legislation and not adjudication."2 5 The Fuentes decision was
unquestionably a controversial one, and it prompted the reassess-
ment of the attachment laws of several states.
26
The broad holding in Fuentes was substantially limited less
than two years later in Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 27 wherein in
the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Louisiana se-
questration statute.2 8  In Mitchell, petitioner sought to invalidate
the Louisiana attachment statute. 29 Pursuant thereto, the sheriff
had taken several household items"0 bought under an installment
payment contract on a writ issued by the parish judge pending
the outcome of an action to recover the value of the debt. Under
the installment contract, and in accordance with state law, the cred-
itor was to retain a vendor's lien on the property until such time
as the purchaser had paid the entire debt.
The Court in Mitchell did not expressly overrule the Fuentes
decision. However, it is apparent that insofar as it limited the re-
quirement of prior notice and hearing before any taking, Fuentes
was indeed restricted.3 ' The majority in Mitchell3 2 reasoned that
consumer with little access to legal help and little familiarity with legal procedures, there
may be a substantial possibility that a summary seizure of property-however unwarranted-
may- go unchallenged, and the applicant may feel that he can act with impunity." Id. at
83, n.13.
23. Id. at 80 quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965).
24. 407 U.S. 67, 81-82.
25. Id. at 96-97.
26. See, e.g., Turner v. Colonial Finance Corp., 467 F.2d 202 (5th Cir. 1972)
Sena v. Montoya, 346 F. Supp. 5 (D.C.N.M. 1972) ; Inter City Motor Sales & Szymanski, 4L
Mich. App. 112, 201 N.W.2d 378 (1972). See also, Clark & Landers, Sniadach, Fuentes and
Beyond: The Creditor Meets the Constitution, 59 VA. L. Rav. 355 (1973).
27. 416 U.S. 600 (1974).
28. The Louisiana sequestration statute provides that the sheriff Is to take control over
the property in question, pending judicial action, and Is similar to the attachment statutes
of other jurisdictions. Id.
29. LA. CODE Civ. PRo. ANN. arts. 3501, 3574 (West 1961).
30. The items sequestered included a refrigerator, range, stereo, and washing machine.
Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 601 (1974).
31. Justice Powell, in his concurring opinion, indicated that in this respect, "I think It
fair to say that the Fuentes opinion is overruled." Id. at 623. Justice Stewart, in his dis-
senting opinion, said, "[T]his case is constitutionally indistinguishable from Fuentes v.
Sh6vin, and the Court today has simply rejected the reasoning of that case and adopted
instead the analysis of the Fuentes dissent." Id. at 634.
32. The majority of the Court in Mitchell consisted of the Justices who had dissented
in Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 68 (1972), in addition to Justices Powell and Rehnqulst,
who did not participate in the Fuentes decision. Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600.
635-36, n.8 (1974).
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the due process requirements delineated in Fuentes could still be
met by "procedural safeguards" that surpass those of the Florida
and Pennsylvania statutes struck down in Fuentes. Mitchell held
that the Louisiana statute was neither unconstitutional on its face
nor as applied, and was distinguishable from Fuentes for several
reasons.
First, it was found in Mitchell, as in Fuentes, that the debtor
undeniably owned the property in question; however, Mitchell re-
cognized that the creditor has an interest in the property as well,
until the debt is paid. The Court maintained that "[t]he question
is not whether a debtor's property may be seized by his creditors,
pendente lite, where they hold no present interest in the property
sought to be seized . . . [,],"" but rather, one of determining
the relative interests of the creditor and the debtor in the same
property. The Court stated that it is necessary to balance the in-
terests of the creditor and debtor. On the one hand, a court must
consider the interest of the creditor to insure that his security in-
terest in the property will not be diminished or destroyed by acts
of the debtor. On the other hand, a court must determine the
rights of the debtor to protect his right to continued use of the
property.3 4 According to Mitchell, the protection to be afforded
the creditor includes guarding against "the risk that the buyer,
with possession and power over the goods, will conceal or transfer
the merchandise to the damage of the seller."3 5
Second, Mitchell found that while the statutes considered in
Fuentes allowed a clerk of court to issue warrants of attachment,
the writ of sequestration involved in Mitchell required issuance by
a judge. 6 The Court concluded, therefore, that "Mitchell was not
at the unsupervised mercy of the creditor and court functionaries.
The Louisiana law provides for judicial control of the process from
beginning to end."37
.Third, the Court in Mitchell determined that "[d]ifferent from
the Florida and Pennsylvania systems, bare, conclusory claims of
33. Id. at 606, n.5. This would be the case in the garnishment of wages, as expressed In
Sniadach.
34. The Court in Mitchell asserted that the Interest of the debtor may never exceed that
of the creditor, until such time as the debt is paid in full, for the :interest of the creditor
"was measured by the unpaid balance of the purchase price. The monetary value of that
interest in the property diminished as payments were made, but the value of the property
as security also steadily diminished over time as It was put to its intended use by the
purchaser." Id. at 604.
35. Id. at 608-09. The Mitchell Court noted that "[a]n important factor ... is that
under Louisiana law, the seller's vendor's lien expires if the buyer transfers possession.
Id. at 609. The expiration of the lien was another factor weighed In the "balancing test."
36. Id. at 616. Louisiana law required that a judge issue the writ in Orleans County
only; all other Louisiana parishes authorized court clerks to perform the function. But
the validity of the procedure outside Orleans Parish was not at issue in Mitchell. Id. at
606, n.3, quoting LA. STAT. ANN. arts,. 281, 282 (1960).
37. Id. at 616.
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ownership or lien will not suffice under the Louisiana statute. 3' 3
Instead, the statute in question in Mitchell required that a writ
be issued "only when the nature of the claim, and the amount
thereof, if any, and the grounds relied upon for the issuance of
the writ clearly appear from specific facts." 39 Furthermore, ac-
cording to the Court, these facts turn on the
existence of the debt, the lien, and the delinquency. These
are ordinarily uncomplicated matters that lend themselves
to documentary proof. . . . The nature of the issues at
stake minimizes the risk that the writ will be wrongfully
issued by a judge.
4 0
Fourth, the Mitchell Court maintained that the rights of the
debtor were sufficiently protected against a wrongful taking by the
creditor. The insurance against the possibility of an unfounded claim
under the Louisiana Statute "is buttressed by the provision that
should the writ be dissolved there are 'damages for the wrongful
issuance of a writ' and for attorney's fees 'whether the writ is
dissolved on motion or after trial on the merits.' ,,41 Moreover,
the Court found that the rights of the debtor were sufficiently pro-
tected because the statute entitles the debtor immediately to seek
dissolution of the writ unless the creditor sustains his burden of
proof in showing that the writ was not improvidently issued. Any
failure by the creditor to support this burden necessitates the dis-
solution of the writ.4 2 This right to an early opportunity to put
the creditor to his proof in Mitchell was distinguished from the
statutory provisions involved in Fuentes, which the Court found
did not allow for an early opportunity to be heard.43 Even if the
debtor does not avail himself of this remedy, the Court determined
that the debtor "may also regain possession by filing his own bond
to protect the creditor against interim damages to him should
he ultimately win his case. .... "
On the basis of Mitchell, the District Court in Guzman upheld
38. Id.
39. Id. quoting LA. CODE CiV. PRO. ANN. art. 3501 (West 1961).
40. Id. at 609-10. The dissent in Mitchell insisted that this contention was not distinguish-
able from the one advanced in Fuentes. Id. at 633. "The issues decisive of the ultimate rights
to continued possession, of course, may be quite simple . . . But it certainly cannot under-
cut the right to a prior hearing of some kind." Fuentes v. Shevln, 407 U.S. 67, 87, n.18
(1972).
41. Id. at 617 quoting LA. CODE Crv. PRO. ANN. art. 3506.
42. Id.
43. The Fuentes court, in reviewing the Florida and Pennsylvania statutes involved
found that the debtor in Florida would "eventually have an opportunity for a hearing,
as the defendant in the trial of the court action for repossession . . . . Pennsylvania
law does not require that there ever be opportunity for a hearing. ... Fuentes v. Shevin,
408 U.S. 67, 75-77 (1972).
44. Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 607 (1974). This conflicts with the Fuentes
statements that the "deterrent effect of a bond requirement is [no replacement for the
right to a prior hearing]. The possibility of regaining possession by a debtor's counter
bond still deprives him of property. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 83, 85 (1972).
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the constitutionality of the North Dakota attachment statute. 45 In
balancing the interests of the creditor and the debtor in accordance
with the Mitchell standard, the court found that the interest of
the debtor in the property was sufficiently protected, and thus
the constitutionality of the statute was upheld. As the Court noted,
measures protecting the debtor included his ability to regain pos-
session of the property either by payment of a bond, in which
case the warrant is immediately dissolved, or by his right to an
early hearing for dissolution of the writ if it appears to have been
irregularly issued.46 Regarding the possibility that a warrant may
be wrongfully issued, the District Court stated that such a risk is
minimized by requirements "limiting the attachment remedy to
nine specific grounds, [47] considered together with the requirement
of strict compliance mandated by ... North Dakota courts.... 48
In the opinion of the District Court, the fact that the issuance
of the warrant of attachment is authorized by a court clerk ra-
ther than a judge, was not a constitutional deficiency because the
creditor must show probable cause before issuance. Further, the
plaintiff has early access to the courts to move for discharge of a
warrant irregularly issued.
49
The District Court recognized that the debtors did indeed suffer
a hardship as a result of the deprivation of their home, but min-
imized the importance of the impact on the debtors in weighing
the debtor's interest. The District Court stated:
[T]he question of whether public policy should exempt such
a mobile home from the 'harsh' remedy of attachment is
a legislative question. . . . [T]o be free from resultant
hardships is not one of the rights guaranteed by the Consti-
tution or laws of the United States."
On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit the case was reversed and remanded. 51 Relying on the
holding in Mitchell, the Eighth Circuit Court said, "[B]ecauseof
vital distinctions between the provisions of the Louisiana sequestra-
tion law and the North Dakota attachment statute, Mitchell dic-
tates that plaintiffs were denied due process of law.' ' 5 The Court
45. Guzman v. Western State Bank, 81 F. Supp. 1262 (1974).
46. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 32-08-18 to 24 (1960) set forth the procedures required to ob-
tain a discharge of the warrant.
47. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-08-01 (Supp. 1973).
48. 381 F. Supp. at 1265.
49. Id. at 1265.
50. Id. at 1267.
51. Also remanded to the District Court was the issue of the liability of the sheriff for
his role in the proceedings. The court said, "[W]e are not inclined to hold as a matter
of law, on review of the summary judgment proceeding, that quasi-judicial immunity
extended to the sheriff. . . . (T]he question . . . should be resolved upon a ventilation of
all of the facts bearing on that issue." 516 F.2d 125, 132-33 (1975).
52. Id. at 129.
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pointed to four areas in which the North Dakota statute failed to
accomodate the conflicting interests of the debtor and creditor.
First, the North Dakota statute did not require that the credi-
tor assert the danger that the debtor may conceal or remove the
goods from the state, which was, the Court noted, "one of the con-
siderations weighed in the balance by the Louisiana law in permit-
ting initial sequestration of the property. ' ' 53 This assertion of dan-
ger that the debtor may conceal or remove the goods from the
state is among the nine possible grounds which the creditor may
assert in his affidavit seeking a warrant of attachment in North
Dakota.
5 4
However, the warrant could still be issued without such an as-
sertion if the creditor relied on any of the other grounds set forth
in the statute. Additionally, it was found that "the affidavit of [the]
defendant . . . does not aver that the summary attachment was
necessary to preserve the property interests of the creditor in the
personalty, nor does North Dakota attachment law require such an
averment." 55 In distinguishing Mitchell the Court of Appeals stated:
[T]he Mitchell opinion suggests that the remedy should
be employed to protect a creditor's interest only if there is
a danger that those interests will be destroyed or defeated
unless such a summary step is taken. . . . If such an emer-
gency situation does not exist, the creditor's interest in the
property probably will not be impaired by a short delay
to provide notice and hearing to the debtor.
5 6
Second, the Court interpreted Mitchell as holding that the issu-
ance of the writ by a judge rather than a court clerk is vital.
The Court of Appeals noted:
Mitchell mandates that we review the North Dakota at-
tachment law to determine if there is meaningful judicial
supervision of the prejudgment attachment process. It is ap-
parent that there is no such supervision.5 7
In the view of the Court of Appeals, the reason for the emphasis
in Mitchell on the active participation of a judge was to insure
53. Id. quoting Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 609 (1974).
54. Defendants here relied on N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-08-01(8) (1960) in their affidavit,
which the Court of Appeals considered "the most general of the nine grounds listed." Guz-
man v. Western State Bank, 516 F.2d 125, 129 (8th Cir. 1975).
55. Id. at 130.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 131.
58. Id. The Eighth Circuit Court stated:
We recognize that In the most recent decision by the Supreme Court in this
area of the law, North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chemn, Inc., -U.S.-
(1975), [decided January 22, 1975], there are suggestions in the concurring
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that judicial discretion would be exercised whenever necessary and
to minimize the likelihood of an improper issuance.5 8
Third, the North Dakota statute allows the debtor to seek an
immediate dissolution of the warrant only after posting a bond prior
to a post seizure hearing,59 whereas the Louisianna statute did not
have such a bond requirement. This prerequisite, the Court said,
places a considerable impediment on any debtor who seeks
to contest the attachment of any item of substantial value,
and to the extent that any debtor is unable to meet the
bond requirement in order to obtain a discharge hearing,
the goal of minimizing the impact on the debtor of a wrong-
ful attachment has been undermined. 0
Fourth, the Court emphasized the resultant hardship to the
debtors as a result of the deprivation of their mobile home. The
impact on the debtors should have been one of the factors consi-
dered in weighing the relative interests of the parties.6 1 The Court
stated:
[H]ere we have more than the inconvenience caused by
the deprivation of some household items. . . . In this case
we have debtors faced with the catastrophe of losing their
home in an ex parte procedure by which they are summa-
rily evicted without any opportunity to be heard and to
resist the grounds for eviction.62
The Court of Appeals took issue with the holding of the District
Court that consideration of the impact was a matter for the le-
gislature. Instead, the Court of Appeals stated that the seriousness
of the deprivation was "a factor to be weighed in determining
if concepts of due process validate specifically the ex parte sei-
zure under review.
' 6 3
The law often has the responsibility of balancing the interests
between two parties with greatly differing claims. However, the
task of reaching a satisfactory compromise in this area of law
is especially complex. It is generally the financially weak who
and dissenting opinions that some of the Justices do not believe that super-
vision of the ex parte proceeding by a judicial officer is required. . . .Never-
theless, we are compelled to observe the criterion established by the opinion
in Mitchell until instructed otherwise by the Court.
Id., n.7.
59. The District Court had construed N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-08-24 (1960) to mean that
a bond was not required for dissolution of a writ that had been irregularly issued. Gus-
man v. Western State Bank, 381 F. Supp. 1262, 1265, n.7 (1974).
60. Guzman v. Western State Bank, 516 F.2d 125, 131 (8th Cir. 1975).
61. Fuentes had minimized the consideration of the "impact doctrine" first mentioned
in Sniadach, because in Fuentes it was held that procedural due process was not "limited
to the protection of only a few types of property interests." Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S.
67, 89 (1972). Mitchell, however, reinstituted the consideration as one of the factors to be
weighed in the decision to issue the writ.
62. Guzman v. Western State Bank, 516 F.2d 125, 132 (8th Cir. 1975).
63. Id.
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find themselves in the position of losing the goods they strenu-
ously endeavored to acquire. We must recognize that these people
are often unaware of their rights, and lack the means to insure
that they are protected. Yet, if the creditor's remedies are exces-




SUBDIVISIONS LIABLE FOR NON-DISCRETIONARY TORTIOUS CONDUCT.
Plaintiff brought an action against the Minot Park District for
the death of her twelve year old son who drowned in an unfenced,
unguarded duck pond. The trial court granted defendant's motion
for summary judgment on the basis of governmental immunity. On
appeal, the Supreme Court of North Dakota reversed and held that
the immunity afforded local governmental entities from tort lia-
bility would no longer be retained. Therefore, political subdivisions
could be, within certain limits, liable for negligence.1 Kitto v. Mi-
not Park District, 224 N.W.2d 795 (N.D. 1974).
Governmental immunity is the protection from liability for tort-
ious conduct afforded local governmental units. 2 Generally, it is
agreed that the doctrine originated in a 1788 Kings Bench decision,
Russell v. Men of Devon.3 Subsequently, the doctrine in Russell
was adopted in the United States,4 and the concept of governmen-
tal immunity -became the general rule in this country.5 Although
immunity previously was a convenient alternative to imposing bur-
densome judgments on budding municipalities,6 this fact does not
1. Judge Johnson, speaking for a unanimous bench, wrote the opinion of the court.
2. Governmental immunity, then, should be distinguished from the concept of sover-
eign immunity which is the immunity possessed by the state government. It might be
more appropriate to term the concept state immunity since sovereignty has other connota-
tions in that sovereignty Inheres in the people. See State ex. rel. Miller v. Taylor, 22 N.D.
362, 133 N.W. 1046 (1911).
3. 2 T.R. 667, 100 Eng. Rep. 359 (1788). This case, involving a tort action against an
unincorporated county, established immunity from liability on two grounds. First, there
was no fund out of which a judgment could be satisfied. Secondly, the court thought it
better that an individual sustain a loss rather than the public suffer an inconvenience.
4. Mower v. Inhabitants of Leicester, 9 Mass. 247 (1812) Mower was dissimilar, how-
ever, since unlike Russell It involved a county that was incorporated, could sue and be
sued, and had a corporate fund out of which a judgment could be satisfied. Thus, the doc-
trine was adopted but the reasoning was not.
5. W. PROSSER, LAw OF TORTS 970-87 (4th ed. 1971).
6. See Vail v. Town of Armenia, 4 N.D. 299, 59 N.W. 1092 (1894). For example, In
